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facing off to see which will
guide Europe’s future.
The European Union owes its very existence to the economic
integration that defines today’s increasingly global economy. From the
ashes of World War II, six core European nations forged a coal-and-steel
community designed to foster industrial competitiveness. Over time, the
nations realized that a common market would best promote European
growth, and the mission gradually broadened to include the general goal
of ever-closer union.
Successive waves of integration raised membership to 15 coun-
tries a decade ago, then to 25 today, with Turkey and several other nations
eager to join in the near future (see map). Along the way, Europe has
seen significant increases in its standard of living as it became economi-
cally freer and more integrated.
Integration and Globalization:
The European Bellwether
by Jason L. Saving2
Creating a common market has
brought benefits. At the same time, it
has meant exposure to worldwide
competition, which creates difficulties
for nations with high taxes and inflex-
ible labor markets. EU members main-
tain less competitive economic poli-
cies than the United States, and glob-
alization has exacerbated the conse-
quences of these policies for their
economies. Some analysts question
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nation vying to compete effectively in
the world economy? As technology
and freer trade integrate economies,
the EU stands at a policy crossroads.
Two conflicting strategies of integra-
tion are facing off to see which will
guide Europe’s future. The stakes are
nothing less than the continued
advance of globalization and its conse-
quences for national and regional
economies.
whether further economic liberaliza-
tion offers the best path to future
prosperity, advocating instead greater
policy coordination to bring taxes,
regulations and other measures into
even closer alignment.
Should EU members integrate
their economies in a way that resists
global economic pressures? Or should
they embrace globalization through
greater economic freedom, with each
Creating a common market
has brought benefits.
At the same time, it has



















































Integration’s Costs and Benefits
Economic integration is the
process through which nations lessen
the economic significance of their bor-
ders. It can take the form of pacts—
such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement and the World Trade
Organization—that reduce tariffs and
other barriers, letting goods and serv-
ices move more freely. It can take the
form of investor protections that foster
capital mobility or visa programs that
help firms find willing workers. When
goods, services, capital and labor can
move to where they are most efficient-
ly employed, economies can grow at
faster rates than they otherwise could.
1
But increasing mobility for goods,
labor and capital entails greater expo-
sure to global economic pressures.
When nations in a common market
choose different labor policies, for
example, those who receive govern-
ment benefits have an incentive to
move from less generous nations to
more generous ones. When tax poli-
cies differ, workers and businesses
have an incentive to move from high-
tax nations to low-tax ones.
2 High-tax,
high-benefit nations find themselves in
a squeeze, simultaneously facing in-
creases in the amount they must
spend and reductions in the tax rev-
enue available to meet their obliga-
tions. The more economically integrat-
ed the world, the greater this penalty
becomes because firms, workers and
capital can search for greener pastures
more readily than ever before. 
Does this apply to Europe? Let’s
look at the competitiveness of Europe’s
15-nation core compared with the U.S.
(Chart 1). The Fraser Institute com-
piles an annual ranking of economic
freedom, based on such factors as size
of government, legal structure and
security of property rights, access to
sound money, freedom to exchange
with foreigners, and regulation of
credit, labor and business. The latest
readings show that the United States
eclipses any current EU member. Past
years also reflect this pattern. While
some economists may question the
precise placement of particular coun-
tries, few would dispute the overall
conclusion that Europe’s economy is
less free than the United States’.
The consequences are evident in
broad measures of economic perform-
ance. Over the past decade, for exam-
ple, the U.S. economy has grown at
an annual rate of 3 percent—relatively
healthy by postwar standards (Chart
2). In contrast, the EU has grown by
barely 2 percent a year, a rate disap-
pointing to economists and policy-
makers alike. The U.S. doesn’t grow
faster than every European nation in
every year, but it does better than
most EU members most of the time.
The unemployment rate also
shows America’s edge in economic
performance. In the U.S., it has hov-
ered around 5 percent for most of the
decade, a rate many economists con-
sider close to full employment (Chart
3). In contrast, Europe’s relatively
inflexible labor markets have pro-
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Increasing mobility
for goods, labor and
capital entails greater
exposure to global 
economic pressures.



























EU Economies Trail in Economic Freedom
U.S. and EU-15 economic freedomduced an unemployment rate 3 to 5
percentage points higher. Unemploy-
ment rates in France and Germany
remain around 10 percent, despite
several initiatives over the past few
years to deal with the issue.
Perhaps the single most telling
statistic is productivity—the amount of
output per hour worked. Largely
dependent on the extent to which
government policies foster a dynamic
economy, productivity has grown by
roughly 2.5 percent annually in the
U.S. over the past decade but only 1.4
percent in Europe (Chart 4).
It has not always been so. In the
heady days of postwar reconstruction
and the formation of the common
market, some economists spoke of a
permanent productivity advantage for
Europe. Now, an emerging consensus
holds that labor and tax policies have
combined with the relatively sluggish
introduction of new technologies to
produce a sustained productivity
deficit for the European economies.
Commentators may point to the
current economic performance of
France and Germany as proof of the
“Eurosclerosis” that besets the conti-
nent’s major economies, but a snap-
shot in time can’t tell the whole story
of economic fundamentals or future
prospects. It is the sustained differ-
ences that suggest something more
fundamental—namely, a gap in com-
petitiveness—has been at work here.
Globalization and Growth
Europe once kept pace with the
United States. Tracking GDP back to
the early 1970s shows that Europe
managed to keep up with the U.S.
until diverging markedly in the 1980s
(Chart 5). This raises an interesting
question. If more competitive econom-
ic policies enabled the U.S. to outper-
form Europe in the 1980s and 1990s,
why didn’t they also enable us to out-
perform Europe before then? 
The answer boils down to one
word: globalization. 
In earlier decades, the world sim-
ply wasn’t as global as it is today. The
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Chart 2
EU Has Relatively Low Growth
U.S. and EU-15 real output
Chart 3
EU Has Relatively High Unemployment
U.S. and EU-15 unemploymentconsequences of high taxes and in-
flexible labor markets weren’t espe-
cially severe in the low-tech, low-
mobility 1960s and 1970s. As global-
ization heated up in the 1980s and
1990s, the cost of these policy deci-
sions—in lost output, slower job cre-
ation and forgone productivity—
became plain for all to see.
Empirical evidence supports this
globalization story. The U.S. leads all
25 EU members in the Harvard Busi-
ness School rankings of national poli-
cies that foster innovation (Chart 6A).
The entire EU, on the other hand,
does worse than the U.S. on the World
Bank’s measure of labor-market poli-
cies that inhibit growth (Chart 6B).
Business-climate indicators paint a
similar picture: For example, an entre-
preneur can create a new U.S. firm in
five days, but it requires an average of
37 days to start one in the EU. Such
data indicate the U.S. should participate
more fully in the global economy, and
a globalization index devised by A.T.
Kearney and Foreign Policy magazine
does indeed show the U.S. ahead of
all but one EU member (Chart 6C). 
The underlying message is as sim-
ple as it is accurate: Nations that offer
more competitive economic environ-
ments will reap greater benefits from a
more open world economy.
Globalization places a premium
on economic freedom and gives
nations greater incentive to engage in
policy competition aimed at liberaliz-
ing their economies. But some worry
that policy competition has gone too
far. A recent report from the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, for example, concludes
that the developed world should elim-
inate the “harmful tax competition”
that tempts firms to move in search of
better business climates. A few months
ago, the finance minister of Germany’s
new coalition government echoed this
concern when he urged the 10 newest
EU members to raise taxes in the
name of fairness. 
Can economics contemplate a
means to thwart cross-border policy
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Chart 4
EU Has Low Productivity Growth
U.S. and EU-15 productivity
Chart 5
Europe Didn’t Always Lag the U.S.
U.S. and EU-15 real outputcompetition? Yes. A federation could
impose minimum tax rates and labor
standards—or even mandate a single
set of tax rates and labor standards—
so no nation could “unfairly” undercut
another and “poach” workers and
businesses.
3 Under this view, Europe
would need an integration that dis-
courages rather than encourages fur-
ther liberalization.
At times, the EU has done exactly
that. In the mid-1990s, Sweden had to
raise its farm subsidies as a condition
for EU entry. In early 2004, the EU
forced the Czech Republic to adopt
labor-market regulations the country
deemed onerous. And in January
2006, Poland fought a pitched battle
with European leaders to keep its tax
rates below what EU leaders wanted.
In each case, countries shared the
goal of binding economies together
but diverged over the terms. 
Some analysts have cast the great
continental debate as a contest between
Europhiles desperate to bind EU coun-
tries together and Euroskeptics deter-
mined to maintain national sovereign-
ty. But integration per se need not be
the issue. After all, a uniformly low-tax
Europe with flexible labor markets
would be just as integrated as a Europe
with uniformly high tax rates and in-
flexible labor markets. The key ques-
tion centers on the kind of integration
Europe ought to undertake. Should it
pursue an integration that fosters free
markets and the economic growth
they bring, or should it pursue an
integration in which member states
band together to resist the economic
consequences of high taxes and heavily
regulated labor markets in a global era?
What Will the Future Hold?
What are the prospects for further
liberalization? Last year, the EU consid-
ered a proposal for free trade in serv-
ices. With goods now accounting for a
dwindling portion of the EU economy,
free trade in services would seem a
logical step for a federation dedicated
to providing a common market across
Europe. Yet, the specter of increased








































































B. Labor Rigidity Index
Index value (100 = best)
C. Globalization Index
Index value (100 = best)
A. Innovation Policy Index
Index value (100 = best)
SOURCE: Harvard Business School.
SOURCE: The World Bank.
Chart 6
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competition from Eastern Europe’s
cheap labor undermined public sup-
port. Bowing to opposition in several
countries, the EU adopted only mini-
mal changes in its services trade poli-
cies. More recently, a months-long
drama featuring massive street protests
forced the French government to with-
draw a proposal to increase labor mar-
ket flexibility with a probationary
employment period during which
young workers would enjoy fewer
benefits and less job security.
These incidents are balanced by
signs favorable to reform. Current
European Commission President José
Manuel Barroso has spoken movingly
of the need for Europe to further lib-
eralize its economy to better compete
in the global marketplace. And to give
just one example where this is hap-
pening, Germany has renegotiated
labor contracts in a few high-cost sec-
tors and has discussed limiting labor’s
historic influence over corporate strat-
egy. These and other events within
the EU suggest Europe’s future policy
direction is far from decided.
The EU stands at a crossroads as
it debates further economic liberaliza-
tion. Some EU members wish to pre-
serve and even expand Europe’s social
protections, so that workers can have
much-needed security in an era of
ever-more-rapid change. Other EU
members want Europe’s economy to
become more flexible, so that eco-
nomic growth can equal and perhaps
even exceed that of the U.S.
Europe can’t simultaneously satis-
fy these competing visions. Either the
EU must liberalize its economy to
compete in a globalized world, know-
ing its workers will have to retrain
faster—and become more highly edu-
cated—than ever before. Or EU nations
can band together to resist further lib-
eralization, knowing that unemploy-
ment will become more prevalent and
economic growth will remain slow.
The European Union has a clear
choice, but the challenge of globaliza-
tion is an issue for every economic
entity on every continent, including
the United States. U.S. labor markets
may be somewhat more flexible than
Europe’s, and the U.S. economy
somewhat more open. But make no
mistake: In areas ranging from steel to
softwood lumber to clothing to autos,
the U.S. faces pressure to ward off
globalization rather than embrace it.
With technologies knitting econo-
mies closer and policies aligned
toward openness, globalization has
advanced steadily in the postwar era.
Future policy choices in the European
Union, United States and other entities
will determine whether the world
continues its progress toward increas-
ing economic integration.
Saving is a senior economist in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
Notes
1 See International Economics: Theory and
Policy, by Paul R. Krugman and Maurice
Obstfeld, 7th ed., Addison-Wesley, 2005, for 
an overview of this and other economic issues
relevant to the global economy. 
2 See “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,”
by Charles M. Tiebout, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 64, no. 5, 1956, pp. 416–24, 
for more on this phenomenon. 
3 “A Single Welfare Benefit Level for Europe?
Efficiency Implications of Policy Harmonization
in a Federal System,” by Jason L. Saving,
Southern Economic Journal, vol. 70, no. 1,
2003, pp. 184–94, contains a more rigorous
examination of the conditions under which 
economic integration can be harmful rather
than helpful.
The European Union
has a clear choice, but 
the challenge of 
globalization is an 
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